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We propose a new approach to the generation of an alphabet for secret key exchange relying on small variations 
in the cavity length of an ultra-long fiber laser. This new concept is supported by experimental results showing 
how the radio-frequency spectrum of the laser can be exploited as a carrier to exchange information. The test 
bench for our proof of principle is a 50 km-long fiber laser linking two users, Alice and Bob, where each user 
can randomly add an extra 1 km-long segment of fiber. The choice of laser length is driven by two independent 
random binary values, which makes such length become itself a random variable. The security of key exchange 
is ensured whenever the two independent random choices lead to the same laser length and, hence, to the same 
free spectral range. 
 
Keywords: fiber lasers; fiber optics communications; optical security and encryption  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Fiber lasers are now well-developed and reliable devices used in a wide range of applications. As it occurs with 
other types of cavity resonators, the confinement of light within the optical cavity of a laser allows only a 
discrete number of longitudinal distributions of electromagnetic field or cavity modes to build up. Such a 
filtering effect features a quasi-periodic frequency response (the exact periodicity being broken by the frequency 
dependence of the fiber refractive index): the frequency spacing between neighboring modes is referred to as the 
free spectral range (FSR) and scales inversely with the cavity length. Although in this work we consider fiber 
laser cavities of a ring type using erbium-doped fibers (EDFs), our results can be extended to different laser 
architectures, which may also include free-space propagation sections provided that the overall gain exceeds the 
cavity losses. 
 Most of the EDF laser cavities studied so far are just a few tens of meters long, entailing a cavity mode 
spacing of a few megahertz. However, it has been demonstrated that the cavity length of a fiber laser can be 
extended to several hundreds of kilometers [1]. This is not surprising in fact if one thinks how low are the linear 
losses of optical fibers at telecommunication wavelengths and how easily these can be compensated by lumped 
or distributed optical amplifiers. The feasibility of extending the laser cavity over the whole communication link 
connecting the two parties, forming an ultra-long fiber laser (UFL), has raised groundbreaking possibilities in 
communications and particularly in secure communications. An innovative concept of a key-distribution system 
based on an erbium-doped or Raman gain UFL has been recently proposed and demonstrated [2–5]. In this 
scheme, each of the two users (conventionally called Alice and Bob) places a randomly chosen, spectrally 
selective mirror at his/her end of the fiber laser, with the two-mirror choice representing a key bit. The security 
in this scheme stems from lasing states that have lost distinguishability, from the perspective of a potential 
eavesdropper, because of their symmetry. The key is coordinated from dynamic changes of the laser Bragg 
reflectors and from lasing state characterization by the legitimate end users. As a classical scheme, very much 
like chaotic lasing in coupled lasers and algorithmic cryptography, an UFL scheme cannot be proven to be 
unconditionally secure (i.e. unbreakable), contrariwise what ideal quantum key distribution schemes are believed 
to be. Instead, the UFL scheme prospective application offers a practical and secure key distribution system, in 
which security is set from technological bounds. Further work is required in order to fully quantify the extent of 
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security provided by the UFL concept. Nonetheless, such schemes offer a practical, reliable and highly secure 
alternative strategy for secret key exchange requiring only readily available, low-cost standard fiber-optic 
components, and being particularly attractive in scenarios where long ranges and fast bit rates are required. 
 In this paper, we propose what is, to the extent of our knowledge, a completely new way of exchanging 
a secret key over an UFL link, which relies on random changes of the FSR of the laser cavity rather than on 
random changes of the cavity losses. Consequently, unlike the previously proposed UFL scheme, our laser is 
always above the lasing threshold, and operates in alternating rapid transient and steady-state modes keeping the 
same optical bandwidth. The key idea of our work is based on the simple observation that the FSR of a laser 
cavity can be used as an information carrier and, hence, processing the FSR traces can make the information bits 
available all along the cavity. For a cavity of tens of kilometer length scale, the FSR is only a few kilohertz wide. 
Measurement of the FSR can be performed, e.g., by a real-time analysis of the electrical signal supplied by a 
photodiode that detects one of the laser outputs. Hereafter we will refer to this new key distribution protocol as a 
radio-frequency shifting key exchange (RFSKE). Specifically, in this scheme the FSR of the laser cavity is 
switched between different values by simply adding or subtracting fiber segments of given lengths to or from the 
cavity. This can be easily implemented by using 1xN switches with N different optical fiber paths so to change 
the cavity length in a pre-designed way. In our implementation N=2, and two out of four possible combinations 
of cavity length choices give the same value of FSR, which entails the possibility of having an undetectable bit 
of information. Instead of a random insertion of optical bandpass filters (BPFs), here we use the natural periodic 
filtering effect of the cavity to tag the laser spectrum in a way that it carries itself the information bits. 
 Switching the cavity length of a laser is a known technique used in metrology for molecular diagnostics 
[6, 7] or in frequency-shifted feedback lasers, where the cavity is modified during the course of time by an inline 
modulator [8, 9]. Note also incidentally that the idea of secret key exchange using a combination of short and 
long path lengths is reminiscent of a quantum cryptographic scheme known as the Franson interferometer [10]. 
However, to the best of our knowledge the concept of FSR coding for secret key exchange has not been 
considered in the context of UFL cryptography yet. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Principle of operation  
Figure 1 depicts a schematic of the UFL-based RFSKE system. The system consists of a bidirectional, 50 km- 
long ring fiber laser, in which in order to exchange a key bit, Alice and Bob independently choose to add a 1-
km-long segment of fiber or leave the cavity length unchanged, with the corresponding indicator functions being 
‘1’ and ‘0’, respectively. Thus, the laser has a random length determined by the combination of users’ choices 
and taking on the values: 50 km (0,0 state), 51 km (0,1 or 1,0 state), and 52 km (1,1 state), and hence random is 
also the FSR. A potential eavesdropper, Eve, measuring the FSR in the (0,0) or (1,1) state can easily infer the 
corresponding cavity length choices and therefore the bits in these cases are rejected. However, in the (1,0) and 
(0,1) states leading both to the same FSR, Eve is unable to determine which user chose which length, thus 
rendering the key-bit exchange secure. Alice, knowing her own length choice, can determine the complementary 
choice of Bob, and vice versa. The two of them can therefore assign, for example, a logical ‘1’ to the (1,0) state, 
and a logical ‘0’ to (0,1). Note that the conditional probability of the cavity length upon a given state is expected 
to be uniformly distributed, and this is ensured in our experiment by a software-driven pseudo-random number 
generator. 
Experimental setup 
The two single-mode fiber (SMF) drums in Fig. 1 play the role of an existent public infrastructure. Each of the 
two bays, called Alice and Bob, provides two allowed access points to the bidirectional ring through 90/10 tap 
couplers with the terminals A1, A2, and B1, B2. Each bay has two 12-m-long segments of EDF that are core 
pumped by a 980 nm diode. The schematic in Fig. 1 does not show that each diode pumps bidirectionally both 
EDF segments through a 50/50 fiber coupler at 980 nm so to maintain the symmetry for clockwise and counter-
clockwise propagation in the ring. A 5-nm-wide optical BPF centered at the fixed wavelength of 1559 nm is 
placed in the middle of each bay. These filters only limit the spectral window in use and do not play any direct 
role in coding. The optical power at the laser output ports is approximately 11 dBm when the laser is operated 
slightly above threshold. A ceramic switch is placed close to each fixed filter. A transistor-transistor logic signal 
can reconfigure the laser by changing the state of the switch from bar to cross mode. In bar (0) mode the switch 
simply connects the main input to the main output; in cross mode (1) the switch adds an extra propagation over 1 
km of fiber in a “loop in loop” setup. A computer-generated random number is sent to a microprocessor unit 
(Arduino DUE) that controls the state of both switches via two logic level shifters (LLSs). The detection of the 
laser output is ensured by a 1-GHz indium gallium arsenide photodiode connected to the analog input of the 
same microprocessor unit that provides a 12-bit analog to digital conversion. The numerical Fourier transform is 
then computed on the computer to obtain the FSR. 
 There are no polarization scrambling elements in our laser, and the whole setup is not acoustically 
isolated from the laboratory environment. Further, we would like to note that the measurements in our 
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experiment are carried out in a contrived laboratory setting rather than in a natural setting as reported in Ref. [11]. 
The acoustic noise of the environment contributes to produce permanent random fluctuations of the 
instantaneous laser intensity. This important issue will be discussed elsewhere. We note however that our 
protocol of coding is based on shifting the radio-frequency spectrum of the laser rather than on instantaneous 
time-domain on-off keying. Incidentally, coding with frequency diversity in the presence of channel noise can be 
seen as an extension of the known technique of orthogonal frequency division multiplexing [12] to ultra-long 
laser communications. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Experimental measurements 
Figure 2 depicts the optical spectra of the laser for the four possible states as obtained from measurements taken 
close to the lasing threshold. The optical bandwidth of the laser is determined by a tradeoff between gain and 
losses in the cavity. To reduce the unavoidable irregularities in the spectra due to the different spectral responses 
of the switches at the different driving voltages, we included an additional tunable 100-GHz optical BPF into the 
laser cavity. This filter only makes the optical spectra more similar to each other and does not play any role in 
information coding. The laser system was on hold during the time of the optical spectrum analysis. A common 
feature of all spectral profiles is a sharp peak with a 3-dB width of 0.11 nm and located at 1560.5 nm. 
Importantly, the (0,1) and (1,0) states have closely similar spectra. This would make it difficult for Eve to deduce 
the states by measuring the optical spectrum.  
 The crucial point of the proposed RFSKE scheme lies in a fast detection of the FSR by analysis of the 
electrical signal emitted by a photodiode. It is useful to recall here that the time-domain analysis of the intensity 
of a light field I(t) relies on the acquisition of the fourth-order correlation function of the field (see, e.g., Ref. [8]). 
We note that a change in FSR originating in a change in cavity length is reflected by a slight frequency shift of a 
component or tone of the radio-frequency spectrum of the laser. Therefore, to shorten the acquisition time and/or 
to facilitate the reading of the laser states, one can inspect those tones that are located at frequencies multiple of 
the basic FSR: the higher the multiple order the larger the tone’s frequency shift. Because the laser radio-
frequency spectrum takes the form of a frequency comb, when the frequency shift of a given tone exceeds the 
tone’s bandwidth, the corresponding change in cavity length can easily be detected. Similarly to what happens in 
dual-comb spectroscopy, however, the frequency detuning being measured should not exceed half of the FSR 
[13]. In our proof-of-principle experiment we analyzed the electrical signal from the photodiode with a radio-
frequency spectrum analyzer (the results are not shown in this paper), and we found that the FSR was 
approximately 4-kHz wide. By looking at the radio-frequencies close to 20 kHz, which represents a multiple of 
five of the FSR, we observed that a change of 2% in laser length (1 km) brings a frequency shift of 0.4 kHz, 
which is a multiple of five of a 2% change in FSR. This confirmed the point made above. The proposed RFSKE 
protocol enables one to write bits of information into physical hertz of the spectrum with an efficiency that can 
be higher than that of laser cryptographic systems based on a random hopping of the laser optical central 
wavelength [3]. In our implementation of the scheme the numerical Fourier transform replaces the more classical 
physical heterodyne beating to detect the hopping in central frequency arising from a change in cavity length. 
Since the state of the laser is stored in an equivalent radio-frequency bandwidth, with the RFSKE scheme, the 
available optical bandwidth can be fully utilized to make multiple pairs of users sharing a common fiber link and 
using different laser channels work in parallel. 
 The buffer of our analog-to-digital converter has a size of 20000 readings, corresponding to a temporal 
window of 20 ms. In principle, such a temporal window would allow for random generation and reading of 50 
laser states per second, although one has to set apart some time for the laser transients (the round trip light time 
in the cavity is 0.24 ms). We tested the reliability of our coding/decoding process by randomly generating 2000 
laser states and reading the electrical output signal from the photodiode. Figure 3 shows the collected data as 
Fourier transforms. Bright colors in the graph indicate likely situations. For ease of reading, the data is grouped 
in four sets, each being conditioned by one of the four possible random choices set by the computer. The data set 
conditioned by the choice of the (0,0) state clearly shows a persistence of the highest intensity around the 
frequency 20.4 kHz: the presence of a local maximum of intensity around this frequency can then be used as an 
indicator to identify the state. Similarly, the longest laser length used for the (1,1) state causes a contraction of 
the FSR and pinpoints the position of the fifth-order radio-frequency tone at 19.6 kHz. The bottom panels in Fig. 
3 show the results when the input states (1,0) and (0,1) are selected: in both cases the fifth-order radio-frequency 
tone is located at 20 kHz, thereby giving the two states the same radio-frequency signature. Alice and Bob can 
remove this ambiguity by tracing the operation modes of their switches. We also note that in the region of radio-
frequency spectrum being studied, the frequency shifts of the spectral tones exceed the tone’s bandwidths. This 
enables the implementation of a simple decision algorithm.  
 The decision step is also of critical importance for a fast evaluation of the FSR. Once the 20000 samples 
were received and Fourier transformed, the strategy that we adopted to detect the FSR was again based on 
monitoring the fifth harmonic of the signal spectrum, as this proved to be effective in our case. We evaluated the 
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spectral intensities p1, p2 and p3 of the signal I(t) at the respective frequencies 20.4 kHz, 20 kHz and 19.6 kHz, 
thereby generating a triplet of  values (p1, p2, p3) for each data acquisition. The compliance bandwidth of the 
spectral profiles was 0.2 kHz. Each reading and signal processing operation can be represented as a point in the 
three-dimensional space of the (p1, p2, p3) parameters which plays the role of a constellation diagram, as shown 
in Fig. 4. If p1 > p2 > p3, a decision is made in favor of the longest possible laser cavity (0,0 state). Similarly, the 
condition p1 < p2 < p3 identifies the shortest cavity (1,1 state). The two states (0,1) and (1,0) are in principle 
indistinguishable since they both attain the same frequency position, as also shown in Fig. 3. In our 
measurements we kept track of the random number generated by the computer so that an error occurred when a 
wrong decision was made. Two thousand laser states were generated randomly, and 98.95% of these were 
correctly detected. The results obtained are summarized in Fig. 4. Different laser states are rendered with points 
of different colors by the random number generator: black indicates the (0,0) state, red is for the (1,1) state, blue 
is for (0,1), and green is for (1,0). The distinguishability of the symbols at the receiver is visualized in this 
constellation diagram by the net distinction among the point clouds of the same color (corresponding to the same 
switch settings). An error would be visualized in the diagram as a point of a different color from the surrounding 
cloud. The indistinguishability of the secure bit states from the perspective of an external eavesdropper is 
visualized by an overlap of the blue and green clouds: in this volumetric region the probability of Eve confusing 
the (0,1) state with the (1,0) state is very close to the ideal case of 50% (i.e., no knowledge of the key). Such a 
probability is drastically reduced for the legitimate users since they can keep track of their own random choice; 
this fact is represented in the diagram by the coexistence of the two color clouds in the same volume. We would 
like to note that the time-domain fluctuations of the laser induce changes of several orders of magnitude in the 
elements of the triplets, and such values are plotted on a logarithmic scale. 
 
Limitation of current setup and future perspectives 
Figures 2 and 3 reveal that there are some residual differences between the (0,1) and (1,0) states in both the 
optical and the radio-frequency domains. These differences stem from the different light losses associated with 
the two states as well as from the different responses of the two switches. To counteract these problems, Alice 
and Bob could include additional ad-hoc components into their setups. While the discussion of all available 
solutions is beyond the scope of this paper, Fig. 2 highlights that a way to remove detectable differences in the 
optical spectra of the laser is to use in-cavity narrowband filtering.  
In our scheme, the key exchange rate between Alice and Bob is fundamentally limited by the number of 
light round trips that are necessary to obtain a clear signature of the cavity modes - the exact number of required 
round trips may vary depending on the type of signal processing and/or optical amplification used. A way to 
obviate this problem would be to exploit the available optical bandwidth in full: with this in mind, we shifted the 
laser central wavelength from 1560.5 nm to 1560.7 nm (the results are not shown in this paper) by manually 
tuning the in-cavity narrowband optical filter. The 3-dB optical bandwidth of the laser was 0.06-nm wide at 
1560.7 nm. We verified that at the new central wavelength the corresponding radio-frequency spectrum still 
allowed the lasing states to be correctly detected with a 98% success rate: as expected, the RFSKE is 
independent of the optical bandwidth filled up by the laser. These results confirm the potential of extending the 
proposed RFSKE scheme to a parallel cascade laser configuration in which each of M lasers operates at a 
different central wavelength: Alice and Bob would then operate M subsystems centered at different wavelengths 
and connected to the common public network fiber by multiplexers/demultiplexers. The transmission speed 
would increase by a factor of M in such case. It is also worth noting here that, since Alice and Bob are in control 
of the active medium of the laser as well as of the frequency-dependent losses, they could differentiate clockwise 
and counter-clockwise propagations in the ring cavity by using non-reciprocal devices such as circulators. At the 
same time, they could attenuate the lasing intensities artificially when they do not use the extra 1-km fiber loop. 
This way, Eve would not be able to extract the information of (0,1) and (1,0) states by monitoring the lasing 
intensities in both directions simultaneously. 
 In our experimental setup, the optical losses associated with the bar and cross modes of the switches 
cannot be separately controlled, in particular the losses associated with the shortest cavity state of the laser 
cannot be increased. Different switching technologies, such as those based on fixed couplers and semiconductor 
or acousto-optic switches, or Mach-Zehnder modulators, could be considered as to improve the system operation. 
 Further, a careful analysis of our system has revealed that the two switches used in this experiment do 
not reject completely either path. Consequently, when at least one of the switches is in cross mode, the radio-
frequency spectrum of the laser features an additional periodicity of 185 kHz, which can be viewed as the effect 
of a nested (or compound) loop of approximate length 1.1 km [14]. However, this fact does not compromise our 
proof of concept: we indeed managed to attain similar responses for the (0,1) and (1,0) states through fine tuning 
of the control voltage of the switches. Incidentally, this fact shows that a fraudulent addition of a nested loop to 
the system would modify the radio-frequency spectrum of the laser, and it would be unveiled by the (0,0) state in 
which neither Alice nor Bob use their extra fiber segment. Real-time monitoring of the radio-frequency spectrum 
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extended to several orders of magnitude for frequency would be desirable to check the integrity of the link and 
strengthen the system’s security.  
 In this experiment, the data reading and decision-making time was significantly longer than 20 ms since 
the microprocessing unit takes about 10 s to send data out to the computer. In other words, the data transmission 
process was longer than the laser transient caused by the switching between cavity lengths. This may temporarily 
spoil or degrade the signatures of the cavity modes by the signal I(t) due to the erratic presence of relaxation 
oscillations, which may explain the observed 1%-2% error rate in the detection process. The laser transients 
could be made shorter by using a different optical amplification technology such as Raman or semiconductor 
amplification, or by using optical modulators. Note that optical modulators or frequency shifters may provide an 
alternative solution to the use of switches and an extra segment of fiber in the system’s setup. This principle has 
been already discussed in the context of lasers for molecular diagnostics in Refs. [6, 7]. In-cavity phase or 
frequency modulators could be used to obtain a fast varying spectrum [9], thereby confusing the optical 
detection by Eve. The use of polarization scramblers could further improve the system. Finally, the UFL-RFSKE 
scheme proposed in this paper could be implemented within a linear laser cavity configuration as well. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
We have presented a new approach to secret key exchange for laser cryptography, and carried out a proof-of-
principle demonstration of this new concept. We have experimentally demonstrated, we believe for the first time, 
how the radio-frequency spectrum of an UFL can be used to establish a secure communication between two 
parties. Although the demonstrated classical cryptographic scheme cannot ensure the same security level than 
that provided by idealized quantum key distribution systems, we believe that it represents an interesting trade-off 
solution to enforce the security of communication systems beyond the standard software protocols and 
employing conventional, off-the-shelf components. Our results open up new avenues to studies involving non-
traditional schemes for secure communications. In this paper we have focused on the presentation of the basic 
concept and the implementation aspects of the new approach. A security analysis will be addressed in a future 
work. Further, the radio-frequency monitoring of an UFL can be of interest for applications in diverse research 
fields, such as in distributed sensing. 
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 LIST OF FIGURES: 
 
 
Figure 1 Schematic of the experimental setup. SMF: single-mode fiber; BPF: bandpass filter; LLS: logic level 
shifter; EDF: erbium-doped fiber. 
 
Figure 2 Optical spectra of the UFL for the four states. Top panel: the black solid curve is for state (0,0), the red 
dashed curve is for state (1,1). Bottom panel: the blue solid curve is for state (0,1), the green dashed curve is for 
state (1,0). The laser central wavelength is 1560.5 nm, and its 3-dB bandwidth is 0.11 nm. 
 
Figure 3 Short-time numerical Fourier transform of the output readings of 2000 experimentally generated 
random states of the laser. The figure is subdivided into four panels, showing the output results conditioned by 
the random choice of one of the four possible states. 
 
Figure 4 Constellation diagram summarizing the output readings of 2000 experimentally generated random 
states of the laser. The red dots are for state (1,1), the black dots are for state (0,0), the blue dots are for state (0,1) 
and the green dots are for state (1,0). 
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